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Water policies and smallholding irrigation schemes 
in South Africa: a history and new institutional challenges. 
1. Abstract 
This paper describes the origin and history of smallholding irrigation schemes –SIS- 
in previously disadvantaged rural areas of South Africa. It then analyses the 
implications of the 1998 National Water Act on those schemes. An analysis of water 
rights is presented, along with a brief case study on a water rights transfer. A number 
of contradictions, uncertainties and possible threats are highlighted, which may hinder 
further development in SIS. Most difficulties originate from the Act’s lacks of clarity 
regarding water rights and from the objectives and socio-economic prospects of the 
schemes. 
 




Since 1994, the South African Government has undertaken massive reforms aiming to 
address rural poverty and inequalities inherited from the past apartheid regime. 
Amongst other programs, it has adopted an ambitious new water legislation that 
promotes equity, sustainability, representativity and efficiency through water 
management decentralization, new local and regional institutions, water users’ 
registration and licensing, and the emergence of water rights’ markets. This paper 
focuses on the specific situation of the numerous smallholding irrigation schemes 
(SIS) that are located in former homelands1, and that now face the new regulations. In 
order for the current issues to be understood, the paper first describes the plight of 
those areas and its origin. It also highlights the past and current institutional 
arrangements regarding access to water and to irrigated land and describes the ones 
that are supposed to be implemented within the framework of the National Water Act 
(NWA). It finally emphasizes the economic and institutional challenges, issues, 
possible contradictions and threats related to the application of the NWA to SIS. 
2.1. Rural poverty and a weak African peasantry: the legacy of discrimination 
policies 
South Africa is a lower middle-income country in which agriculture accounts for a 
particularly low share of GDP compared to most other countries of its category. 
                                                   
1 From the Natives Land Act of 1913 on, a number of homeland areas (also derogatorily called Native areas) were 
delineated according to ethnic, geographical and economic criteria, and formed “reserves” for black people. Such 
spatial discrimination was developed and implemented further under the apartheid regime. Reserves were granted 
some form of autonomy from central government. Some of them ultimately were declared self-governing 
independent states (Bantustans), although not recognized internationally. Homelands and the so-called independent 
Bantustans have all been re-incorporated into the country in 1994 (see map 1).    4 
Although it has a well-performing commercial sector, agriculture represents less than 
4 percent of GDP and 14 percent of the labor force. Moreover, irrigated agriculture 
and stock watering use about 52 percent of total water usage (Government 
Communications and Information Systems-GCIS, 1998). 
The rural population of South Africa is composed of approximately 1.5 million 
households living on commercial farms (mainly white) and 2.3 million households 
living in the former homelands. Approximately half the country’s population lives in 
rural areas, and poverty rates are higher there than elsewhere (incidence of 71.6 
percent). Poverty is race-related: some 61 percent of black people are poor, compared 
with 1 percent of whites. Three out of five children in South Africa live in poor 
households. Households headed by women are more likely to live in poverty than 
households headed by men (Forgey et al., 1999). 
These persistent traits have several causes, the first one directly derives from the past 
apartheid policy. It excluded black people (representing 76 percent of the population) 
from owning or renting land outside the 14 percent of the country that was delineated 
as reserves (known as Bantustans or homelands, see footnote 1 and map 1). Moreover, 
today, land still remains mostly state-owned, and is granted to users through 
traditional authorities and regulations. These areas are typically poor rural areas, 
where many people live under conditions of deprivation as harsh as elsewhere in 
poorer African countries. Apartheid involved incentives, laws and institutions that 
favored large farms and discriminated against smaller, labor intensive farming 
systems (Lipton et al., 1996). Apartheid also gave large white farms privileged access 
to natural resources, financial and agribusiness facilities, and rural infrastructures. 
Black areas still suffer severe backlogs in all the above-mentioned fields. Regarding 
resource-related issues, 83 percent of agricultural land is in the hands of white 
farmers, and about 96 percent of irrigation water is controlled by private and co-
operative schemes, and irrigation boards (Kirsten et al., 2000). The per-capita 
consumption of domestic water in black rural area is less than a twentieth of that 
consumed in typical white areas (Hamann & O’Riordan, 2000). 
A second factor in the weakness of African small-scale farming is related to South 
Africa’s relatively well-developed non-agricultural labor market (mines and 
industries), which has, for a long time, provided higher paying opportunities than 
farming for rural black labor force (Low, 1986). This off-farm market dominates labor 
allocations and generates adult male migration. Labor remaining in the rural areas is 
first assigned to production to home consumption, and, only at last, to production for 
sale. This suggests that off-farm employment opportunities seriously deplete the 
available labor supply for farming. Therefore, workers who remain on the farms are 
those with the lowest opportunity costs as defined by the external labor market. The 
off-farm labor market favors men. Thus, many rural households are de facto headed 
by women or pensioners for whom household and child rearing responsibilities 
exclude them from intensive field labor in agriculture (Perret et al., 2000). Such is the 
case in SIS (Shah & Van Koppen, 1999; Merle et al., 2000). 
2.2. Water resource: scarce and unevenly distributed  
South Africa is a water scarce country, due to its low average annual precipitation 
(less than 500mm), and the unevenness of surface and groundwater distribution which 
are a result of climate and geography (21 percent of the country receives less than 
200mm). Only 8.6 percent of rainfall converts to useable runoff, the lowest proportion 
in the world according to Davis & Day (1998). The same authors estimate that there   5 
will be no spare water in South Africa beyond 2020 if the whole population is 
adequately supplied. 
Still, water scarcity is currently more a “socially constructed concept” according to 
Hamann & O’Riordan (2000). About 14 million rural and suburban black South 
Africans still do not have access to running water in their homes. Rural women have 
to walk long distances to collect domestic water from rivers or water points. 
Depending on one’s literature source (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry-
DWAF, 1997; GCIS, 1998) irrigation and stock watering account for about 52 to 55 
percent of all water used in South Africa. Twelve percent is used for domestic and 
municipal purposes; 7.6 percent by industry; 2.7 percent by mining, and 2.3 percent 
for power generation. Runoff reduction owing to commercial afforestation is 
estimated to be about 7 percent and about 15 percent is required for ecological 
purposes. 
2.3. Current reforms and challenges 
Since the mid 1980’s, the apartheid system has been gradually dismantled, and from 
1994 onwards, the new democratic South Africa has striven to iron out distortions and 
discrepancies. However, the mere removal of past biases against rural black areas has 
not automatically corrected the balance between white and black rural areas. The 
government has undertaken to reduce rural poverty, and has adopted a land reform 
program, new water legislation and improved services delivery in rural areas (Kirsten 
et al., 2000; Brooks, 2000). At the same time, it has adopted liberalism as its 
economic and developmental guideline. Direct consequences are: State withdrawal 
from former commitments and controls, the liberalization of markets, 
decentralization, and the transfer of power to local management and decision-making 
structures. Local government or emerging private management structures are seldom 
prepared for this quick hand-over process. 
Today the major dilemma for a government faced with budget constraints and social 
pressures, is to reconcile a social, rights-based, gap-filling and developmental 
approach with an approach based on productivity and economic efficiency. Such an 
issue is reflected in the difficult circumstances currently facing SIS of South Africa. 
3. Water policies and small-scale farmers irrigation schemes 
3.1. History 
At present, South Africa has an estimated 1.3 million ha of land under irrigation for 
both commercial and subsistence agriculture. Irrigation was introduced to South 
Africa soon after the arrival of European settlers, although it was really developed 
from 1912 onwards. Bruwer & Van Heerden (1995), then Van Averbeke et al. (1998) 
described thoroughly this evolution, stressing especially the early gap that existed 
between white- and black-oriented irrigation policies. 
In the former Bantustans or Native Areas, minor irrigation developments occurred 
before 1950. Most irrigation schemes were started after the publication of the report 
from the so-called Tomlinson Commission on the socio-economic development of the 
Bantustans (Union of South Africa, 1955). This report and the implementation of 
some of its recommendations had a major effect on settlements, land use patterns and 
irrigation development in black rural areas (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). Its effects are 
still very noticeable today. Based on information collected from existing schemes, the 
Commission suggested that irrigated holdings of 1.3 to 1.7 ha were adequate to   6 
“provide a family with a living that would satisfy them, whereby the whole family 
would work on the holding”. It also proposed that: 
•  “Determined action be taken to improve and re-plan all existing schemes, so that 
each holding can provide a full-time living to a Bantu family”; 
•  “New schemes, which can be operated by simple diversion of weirs and furrows, 
be developed during the next 10 years”; 
•  “The Trust (referring to the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936; the South African 
Development Trust acquired land from non-African owners within the Scheduled 
Native areas for redistribution to African people, under management of the 
Department of Native Affairs,) should acquire ownership of the land, all land 
belonging to individuals or tribes and which fall under the proposed schemes 
should be bought up […] and former owners should be given preference when 
holdings are allotted on completion of the schemes”; 
•  “All schemes should be placed under proper control and supervision, with 
uniform regulations as regards water rates, credit facilities and conditions of 
settlement…” 
Preliminary surveys estimated that the irrigation potential of the Bantustans was about 
54000 ha, sufficient to settle 36000 families. Schemes developed during the late 
1950s and 1960s followed most of these recommendations (Van Averbeke et al, 
1998). They would employ a relatively inexpensive design (furrows would convey 
water from a weir or a dam) , and aim at a family’s subsistence through surface 
irrigation. 
During the 1970s, Bantustans were encouraged to become independent on a political 
and administrative level, resulting in the withdrawal of central government, and 
homelands’ administrations taking-over (homelands’ parastatal corporations were 
created, e.g. Tracor in Transkei, Ulimocor in Ciskei, ARDC in Venda, Gazankulu, 
Lebowa, etc.). 
3.2. The current situation and recent developments 
As described in table 1, due to history and past policies, different types of irrigation 
schemes have evolved in South Africa. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
At the end of the apartheid era, existing smallholding irrigation schemes in South 
Africa conformed to the following types, referred to as Bantustan schemes in table 1 
(Bembridge, 2000): 
•  Bureaucratically managed smallholder schemes, formerly partly or fully 
administered by the government or its agencies (corporations) which carried out 
most farming operations on behalf of farmers. Most smallholding irrigation 
schemes conform in varying degrees to this category. Such schemes have high 
recurrent costs and are usually a large financial burden on the State; their usual 
aim is to help farmers produce their own food and possibly a surplus for sale; 
•  Community schemes or garden schemes, which are numerous but usually very 
small in size and supported at the outset by NGOs, development projects or 
government departments. After several years, many of them collapse due to 
maintenance and management problems. Some remain operational and are 
maintained by community users or their representative. Subsistence is the major 
objective underlying such schemes; 
•  Several State or corporation financed schemes (such as sugar cane) for which 
government provides infrastructure down to farm gates. Farmers pay a subsidized   7 
water fee and make most farming and management decisions. Such schemes are 
rare in South Africa; 
•  Several large estate schemes, which are State or private sector financed, often 
managed by agents whose aim is to maximize the use of resources through 
production of high return cash crops (e.g. tea, coffee, fruit, etc.). There is 
generally little farmer participation, farmers being more supervised farm-workers 
than decision-makers. 
The current situation indeed reflects the origins and evolution as described in 3.1. In 
South Africa, SIS cover approximately 46000 to 47500 ha (Bembridge, 2000; 
Northern Province Department of Agriculture-NP-DAE, 2000) as former Bantustan 
schemes, and about 50000 ha as garden schemes and food plots. Almost half of them 
are located in the Northern Province (171 schemes represent 20000 to 22000 ha). It is 
estimated that two thirds of South Africa’s SIS are dedicated to food plots, the 
purpose of which is subsistence, and that 200000 to 230000 rural black people are 
dependant at least partially for a livelihood on such schemes. 
Bembridge (1996, 2000) states that the performance and economic success of SIS in 
South Africa have been very poor, and “fall far short of the expectations of planners, 
politicians, development agencies and the participants themselves, and that despite 
huge investments”. However, one must acknowledge that such economic success has 
never been the clear and unique objective underlying the past and present 
development policies for SIS. Past policy promoted subsistence-based activities by 
farmers, who were virtually “spoon-fed” by parastatal agricultural corporations (Shah 
& Van Koppen, 1999). In addition, and conversely to the assumption made by the 
Tomlinson Commission report, irrigation smallholding families diversified their 
activities and livelihood systems, especially with massive migration of male labour. 
The end result being that women and pensioners remained in the schemes, and carried 
out extensive food crop and livestock farming, with weak or unclear property rights 
on land and water resources (Merle et al., 2000). 
It is worth noticing that the gradual shift in the underlying paradigm of SIS in South 
Africa (i.e. from subsistence purposes to productivity, economic performance and 
financial autonomy), continues to lack clear institutional environment, the means to 
achieve the objectives, and actual people participation. Most schemes were developed 
for social and food security purposes during the apartheid era, in the early 1960s. 
From the early 1980s, management agencies (corporations) were faced with such 
financial and social problems that they encouraged farmers to make cash profits, in 
order for them to pay back production costs and services. However, food security 
remained the major objective and crops and production patterns remained the same, 
along with weak market opportunities and poor agribusiness environment. At the 
same time, due to infrastructure degradation, consultants were hired to set up 
rehabilitation plans. Hence, the more sophisticated technologies (pumps, sprinkler 
irrigation) that were introduced in certain schemes and which require even higher 
capital, operation and maintenance costs. 
Following (and in certain instances before) the dismantlement of apartheid, 
management agencies were liquidated and government gradually withdrew from its 
past functions in SIS (service, technical advise and extension, training). 
In the Northern Province, it is acknowledged that most of the 171 SIS are moribund 
and have been inactive for many years (NP-DAE, 2000). Several causes have been 
mentioned, i.e. infrastructure deficiencies emanating from inappropriate planning and 
design, and/or poor operational and management structures, both beneficiaries and 
government assigned extension officers lacking technical know-how and ability,   8 
absence of people involvement and participation, inadequate institutional structures, 
inappropriate land tenure arrangements. In the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal, most 
schemes are also facing major infrastructural and institutional problems, along with 
local political power games that have characterized those schemes from the outset, 
and that hinder effective problem solving. 
Since the late 1990’, provincial governments have set up rehabilitation and 
management transfer programs across the country (Eastern Cape Restructuring 
Authority, 2001; NP-DAE, 2000), although the approaches have been very diversified 
in each case. For provincial departments, the underlying idea is undoubtedly to curtail 
the heavy financial burden of SIS, as most of them are not contributing to the 
commercial agriculture stream. On the other hand, departments would like to promote 
the emergence of small-scale commercial farmers (which is also the motto of the 
National Department of Agriculture), as well as maintaining the community 
subsistence function of the schemes. 
Still, all rehabilitation and reactivation efforts face the same dilemma, i.e. how can the 
social and economic aspects of these approaches to SIS be reconciled?  
The National Water Act of 1998 provided an opportunity to re-think the paradigm 
underlying SIS development in South Africa and to develop new institutions. 
4. Water use from a property rights perspective 
4.1. Past water policies and water rights 
Rights to use water in South Africa were subject to successive water legislations, the 
principles of which had their roots in the Roman, Dutch, then English laws 
(Thompson et al., 2001) 
The creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 paved the way for the first 
nationally applicable water legislation- The 1910 Irrigation Conservation of Water 
Act. The riparian principle was the central feature of water law and State involvement 
in water resource management was limited to irrigation related works. Post World 
War II industrial development in South Africa required water legislation to be 
adjusted, giving birth to the 1956 Water Act. The act consolidated control, 
conservation and use of water for domestic, agriculture, urban and industrial purposes 
and perpetuated the riparian principle in terms of “normal” flow and “private” water, 
which granted exclusive use but not ownership. In practice, the system of riparian 
rights resulted in commercial white land-owning farmers having essentially 
unconstrained access to water, due partly to a tenuous distinction between private and 
public water and streams (Hamann & O’Riordan, 2000). Furthermore, much of South 
Africa’s past water legislation had been largely oriented towards irrigated commercial 
agriculture (Gildenhuys, 1998). Despite certain legal restrictions, the riparian owner 
could in effect do and take as much as he/she needed. In commercial agriculture areas, 
the irrigation boards that administrated the allocation of water were generally heavily 
biased towards the needs of farmers. In theory, rural black communities and SIS could 
benefit from the same conditions. However, the lack of proper infrastructure, of 
property rights regarding resources, and the subsistence nature of their productive 
activities strongly limited the potential for improvement and intensification. Most 
black populations were not only deprived of access to water and land for irrigation 
purposes but also of adequate and clean water for domestic use.   9 
4.2. New institutions for water management 
4.2.1. Principles of the 1998 National Water Act 
With the dismantlement of former regulations and the adoption of a new democratic 
constitution, South Africa also adopted a new water policy, which culminated in the 
acceptance of a new National Water Act –NWA (Act 36 of 1998). The new act broke 
drastically with the previous water laws in the sense that past key concepts were 
discarded. These include the individual right to use water for riparian users. Water is 
now considered a common asset. The NWA specifies that government, as the public 
trustee of the nation’s water resources, must act in the public trust to ensure that water 
is “protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable 
and equitable manner for the benefit of all persons” (DWAF, 1999 & 2000). The right 
to use water is granted to users, most of whom have to be registered and licensed, and 
should pay for this right. Also, the core concept of water management under the new 
dispensation is decentralization. Finally, protective measures are meant to secure 
water allocation for basic human needs, ecological and development purposes 
(concept of “Reserve”, and “Schedule 1” use, see below). 
4.2.2. Management entities 
Social development, economic growth, ecological integrity and equal access to water 
remain key objectives of the new water resource management regulation. The Act 
distinguishes national areas of water management from regional and local ones. New 
management entities (Catchment Management Agencies and Water Users’ 
Associations) will be established in order to achieve the aims of the Act. These 
institutions are to be established at regional and local level respectively, emphasizing 
a largely decentralized and participatory approach to water resource management. 
The core purpose of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) is to ensure the 
sustainable use of water resources in their areas of operation, in line with the aims of 
the Act, the National Water Resource strategy, and with a Catchment Management 
Strategy. Nineteen Water Management Areas have been demarcated countrywide. 
Several pilot CMAs are currently being established, with facilitation and supervision 
activities being undertaken by regional offices of the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) and contracted consultants.  
The CMAs provide the second tier of the water management structure set up by the 
Act and they operate within the framework provided by the Minister of Water Affairs 
and Forestry. Local implementation of a catchment management strategy will be 
carried out by institutions to which the CMA may delegate functions, e.g. Water 
Users’ Associations (WUAs). 
WUAs potentially form the third tier of water management and will operate at local 
level. These WUAs are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users 
who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit. The role of the 
WUA is to enable a community to pool financial and human resources in order to 
carry out more effectively water related activities. Irrigation on a commercial or 
subsistence scale is one of those activities (DWAF, 1999 & 2000). 
4.2.3. Water use rights 
Table 2 describes the different water use rights that are determined by the NWA. 
At rural community and smallholding farming levels, all individual users are 
authorized to take water for “reasonable domestic use, gardens and stock watering”   10 
(though not for commercial purposes) without registration, licensing or payment, as 
stipulated in Schedule 1 of the Act. 
The Act however also stipulates that farmers and rural communities should form 
WUAs, especially in smallholding irrigation schemes. They must apply for a license, 
which will determine their collective rights to the water resource and their obligations. 
It may also concern the community as a whole when a WUA is to manage water 
beyond irrigation purposes.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
DWAF has launched a massive users’ registration campaign. It will be followed by a 
verification stage, with satellite and aerial images, as a basis for management and 
water fee recovery. 
5. Water rights: key elements for implementing the NWA 
This section discusses the institutional aspects of the NWA and its application to SIS.  
5.1. Property-rights as institutions: definition of concepts 
The term “institutions” in economics usually refers to the humanly devised rules of 
behavior that shape human interactions (North, 1990). Since pioneering works by 
Schmoller (1900, quoted by Furubotn & Richter, 2000), institutions have been defined 
as “sets of formal and informal rules, including their enforcement arrangements”. 
Institutions aim to steer individual behavior in a particular direction, as they “define 
the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies” (North, 1994). Thus, 
institutions (the Act, water rights, social and cultural norms, etc.) can be considered as 
a set of rules, even though they remain “the grin without the cat” (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2000), i.e. the rules of a game without the players. The functioning of an 
institution also depends on the individuals who use it. Institutions together with the 
people using them are called organizations (e.g. Catchment Management Agencies, 
Water Users’ Associations, farmers and communities…). 
Institutional analysis within economics is especially concerned with one specific 
subset of human interactions, i.e. allocation and use of scarce resources. In this regard, 
institutions that define property rights are of primary importance. 
In an institutional context, property rights refer to a subset of institutions that 
regulates behavior and social interactions with respect to objects of value, e.g. 
resources such as land and water. The concept actually does not refer to the objects 
themselves; it is wider than the legal concept of property rights and private property, 
and it includes social norms (force of etiquette, social custom and acceptance, 
voluntary ostracism, codes of conduct, etc.) (Alchian, 1977, quoted by Eggertsson, 
1990). When resources are not available in sufficient quantity to meet the objectives 
of all individuals within a society (concept of scarcity), discrimination is necessary to 
determine the extent to which each individual’s objective will be satisfied (Challen, 
2000). Property rights define this discrimination in terms of constraints and 
permissions, taking into account the consistency, predictability and social 
acceptability of such discrimination.  
5.2. Issues related to water rights 
The Act proposes a set of possible water rights (see table 2). It remains unclear as to 
which category of water rights will apply to small-scale irrigation farms.   11 
Under the NWA, only WUAs may apply for a license and may be granted the right to 
use water under specified conditions. Failure to become a member would limit 
individuals’ right to use water other than as specified in Schedule 1. Individually (at 
household level), rural people are automatically granted a free and unregistered right 
to “reasonably” use water for irrigation (Schedule 1). The NWA urges rural 
communities and smallholding irrigation farmers to form WUAs, that will be 
registered, licensed and charged (water fees). Moreover, WUAs are likely to impose 
water management rules and schedules, which are often sources of conflicts and 
discontentment in farming communities. A question is pending therefore as to what 
the incentive is for farmers to partake to a WUA, knowing the difficulties this may 
entail, while they are allowed to use water otherwise. The DWAF argues that a license 
might give room for intensification and commercialization through increased water 
allocation (reviewed license), then consumption. Such a process unfortunately does 
not only depend on water. The economic history of irrigation development in South 
Africa shows that success or failure of irrigation development in the past is related to 
the marketing potential of agricultural products and the level of profitability of 
farming (Backeberg & Groenewald, 1995). Most SIS are currently not fully using 
their water rights (low consumption) (Bembridge, 2000).  Furthermore, all operators 
recognize that there is little additional water that can be tapped in most basins, and 
that the Act itself implicitly recommends reducing the agricultural share of the 
national water consumption (Hamann & O’Riordan, 2000). 
The loss (withdrawal or transfer) of a license would automatically transform a co-
operative effort into scattered individual ones as defined in Schedule 1. Although 
contradictory to the current policy that encourages the emergence of commercial 
smallholding farming systems through irrigation, such a loss actually might not be a 
problem at farm level, as most small-scale farmers currently use water very 
“reasonably”, i.e. for crops grown in limited areas, meant for self consumption, even 
if the plots are part of irrigation schemes (Bembridge, 2000). A report by the 
International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage 
(2000) considers that most small-scale irrigation usages are classified or will be 
classified under Schedule 1. Schreiner et al. (2000) considers that small-scale farmers 
who cultivate less than 2ha should not be included in the registration campaign, 
because it is expected that they will not be obliged to pay, even if they market a 
substantial part of their crops. 
All these aspects, along with the emergence or increasing demand of non-agricultural 
users (especially mines) put pressure on community users, especially SIS, and paves 
the way to water rights transfer from communities to other sectors (see below). 
A valid argument for the establishment of WUAs in a community setting is the need 
for sound local water management, in a context of resource scarcity and competing 
uses. The stated objectives are multi-faceted: 
(1) To support the existing subsistence-oriented farming systems (food security), 
(2) To promote the emergence of commercial farmers using water-conservation 
technologies, 
(3) To facilitate the coordinated access to water by the whole community, 
(4) And finally, to protect the community’s water rights. 
This should be accompanied by a series of measures and incentives, so that other key 
functions may also be carried out by the WUA (especially regarding markets access, 
i.e. inputs, credit, products, services and information). Schemes in which food plots 
are predominant should be dealt with separately (Schedule 1).   12 
According to DWAF’s initial plans, most WUAs should currently be registered. The 
situation is however very diverse. Most of the former white irrigation boards are 
registered and have submitted a proposal to form a WUA, whereas the establishment 
of WUAs in small-scale government-owned irrigation schemes is very slow. 
Although some WUAs’ constitutions have been submitted for registration, only about 
ten pilot associations have been established formally so far (amongst about 300 
schemes countrywide). 
5.3. Possible emergence of a water-rights market: a case study 
It has been argued by a number of authors (Armitage, 1999; Louw and Van 
Schalkwyk, 2000) that the new Water Act provides the framework for water markets 
in South Africa. Although stated vaguely the water legislation makes provision for 
water rights trading as an option for water allocation. The Act is however, very 
unclear regarding the legal transfer of water use licenses.  
Sectorial water rights trading already exists between commercial irrigation farmers (Armitage et al., 
1999) and has proved to be efficient in certain instances. It must be emphasized that the DWAF played 
an important role in the successful cases, assuring transparency, supervising and recording transactions. 
All large users (mines, industries, cities…) are registered. Certain mines plan to 
expand their activities and their need for water. Some are investigating the possibility 
of buying water rights from SIS (Development Planning & Research, 2000), while 
others are already proactive, negotiating with smallholding irrigation schemes and 
communities to create “multi-users” water associations, in order to increase their 
water supply (Rouzere, 2001). Negotiations have already taken place in different 
areas of the Northern Province in the water stressed basin of the Olifants river (see 
map 1), under close monitoring by DWAF and the provincial Department of 
Agriculture (NP-DAE). The idea behind it is that most SIS are not currently using 
their entire water rights, in terms of allocated quantity, while newly settled mines or 
mines expanding their activities are in dire need of water. Moreover, mines provide 
most job opportunities in the areas.  
INSERT MAP 1 
In the specific case of the Arabie irrigation scheme (Rouzere, 2001), water rights 
might be transferred temporarily from SIS to mines (5 years), the former then being 
deprived of about 70% of the water they are allowed to use (which they are not 
currently using). Mines will pay a financial compensation to NP-DAE for the 
rehabilitation of schemes (the amount of which represents less than 0.1% of the total 
cost of mining plant’ development). Such an arrangement is supposed to allow the 
mines to operate quickly, according to their plans and to give DWAF more time to 
make further plans regarding resource mobilization in the area (upgrading existing 
dams, building new ones). 
A series of issues must be highlighted, with regards to those processes and 
arrangements: 
•  Rural communities and smallholding irrigation farmers are often not even 
aware of the process (Stimie et al., 2000; Rouzere, 2001). Negotiations first 
take place between mines, DWAF and NP-DAE. Information is not only 
asymmetric, it is merely inexistent at community level. Effective community 
representation and information is only scheduled at a later stage. At the 
moment, the NP-DAE represents the communities.   13 
•  The mines have submitted a proposal to establish a multi-sectorial WUA, in 
which they will use 86% of water and pay 93% of all costs incurred (DWAF 
and local municipalities will pay 7%). Such a WUA is not likely to promote 
commercial-oriented production in SIS, nor to co-ordinate water management 
at scheme level, which are the 2 required conditions for the development of 
SIS. The question remains as to the role of communities in this heavily top-
down oriented process, reminiscent of former institutional and development-
support operations (before 1994). 
•  Overall benefits in terms of water resource are not that clear-cut. If there was 
no new water allocation, it would be necessary to generate new water resource 
in the area in 2010; if water were allocated to mines according to their needs, 
it would be necessary in 2003; with water rights transfer from SIS to mines, it 
would be necessary in 2006. 
•  So far, quantitative and economic aspects have been used as arguments for 
decision-making. However, water quality issues may rise, since externalities 
from mining activities are likely to be very different from those resulting from 
small-scale agricultural use. The DWAF takes such concerns into account, 
however, when granting licenses. 
•  Even before any final decisions are made, mines are busy building up the 
necessary infrastructures for supplying water to their plants. They are 
investigating the possibility of co-funding and organizing water supply to the 
communities as well. In the short term, communities will obviously be more 
interested in domestic water supply than in securing their irrigation water 
rights. 
•  Mines provide most male job opportunities in the area, while conversely, 70% 
of small scale irrigation farmers are women, assuring food supply and some 
cash income to rural families. Socio-economic aspects (poverty alleviation, 
food security, gender equity) should be taken into account and counterbalance 
pure economic ones. 
•  Finally, there is a lack of foresight regarding the close future (5 years). If there 
is an increase in water demand by mines, and in the event that DWAF can not 
increase the availability of water resource in the area, the transfer of water 
rights is likely to be extended further. The prospects for small-scale irrigation 
development in the area will then just be abandoned. 
Such a case study highlights the difficulty of implementing a multi-objective water 
policy in a context of competing uses and of extremely different users in terms of 
economic performance and power. 
5.4. Links between water rights and land rights 
The question of land rights is problematic in SIS. The land reform program that is 
currently being implemented, and especially its land tenure component, is not 
evolving as quickly as the water rights reform (Van Zyl et al., 1996; Lahiff, 1999; 
Kirsten et al., 2000). 
Most SIS areas form part of former homelands and are State-owned land (communal 
land). Plots are allotted and occupiers are issued with PTO (permission to occupy) 
certificates. PTOs used to be granted mostly to male farmers by traditional authorities, 
with control, monitoring and records being taken charge of the local magistrate and/or 
local offices of the Department of Agriculture. A PTO gives exclusive individual life-
time usufructuary rights to the land but does not allow it to be sold, mortgaged, leased   14 
or subdivised. Although it falls far short of private ownership, such a system appeared 
to be a relatively secure form of tenure (Lahiff, 1999; Merle et al., 2000). 
PTO certificates remain the main visible claim to land, even though, technically, they 
have been obsolete since 1991 (Abolition of Racially-based Land Measures Act, 
1991). The subdivision, rental or even sale of plots are now observed as emerging 
practices by SIS farmers (Merle et al., 2000). In other words, the PTO system has 
gradually shifted from a real land entitlement to a convention, as records are no longer 
kept on allocation or tenure in most rural areas. SIS farmers, and especially women, 
actually do not exactly know what their current land rights are. At the same time, 
water rights based on a convention are being replaced by entitlement (licensing). 
In SIS, land rights transactions (casual rental, lease or sale) remain highly dependant on the water rights 
attached to that land, especially in terms of land pricing. In most SIS, emerging commercial farmers 
might be interested in taking over both rights from subsistence farmers. The current uncertainty is a 
hindrance to SIS development. 
6. Conclusion 
The National Water Act (1998) of South Africa is internationally recognized as the 
most promising legal framework to adequately address the countries’ challenges in 
water management. 
The present paper analyses its possible or observed implementation features in 
smallholding irrigation schemes, and highlights a series of issues. 
Although highly commendable, the Act has to deal with several objectives (i.e. 
resource protection, social equity and development, economic efficiency) that may 
show contradictory and difficult to implement in a context of resource scarcity, severe 
backlogs in rural areas, competing users, needs for economic performance and job 
creation, etc. This creates a strong dilemma, which is reflected in the different streams 
of thought inside the National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry -DWAF, and 
in the implementation features of the above-mentioned case study. The overall task 
seems challenging if a balance has to be obtained between at least maintaining the 
current production capacity of commercial agriculture, modernizing developing 
agriculture and creating new off-farm employment opportunities (and added value) 
that reduce poverty in rural areas (Backeberg & Odendaal, 1998). 
On a practical level, the National Water Act also remains unclear about the 
implementation features of several key issues (e.g. water rights and local institutions, 
water market). 
This forces the DWAF to operate on a case basis, which is time consuming and 
expensive. Lack of manpower and skills means that external consultants, who are not 
liable for their recommendations and advice, are resorted to. Such an approach, 
however, seems unavoidable at the moment. 
The Act is difficult and slow to implement in the realm of smallholding irrigation 
farming, due to a number of uncertainties and contradictions regarding the objectives 
and prospects of SIS. A key issue will probably be to set clear objectives for SIS, on 
an individual case basis. The ones with a good potential for sustainable irrigated 
productive activities should have clear, irrigation-oriented, and protected water rights, 
as well as irrigation WUA for sound local water management. If this happens, water 
rights and their management might become levers to alleviate poverty and promote 
local development.   15 
A brighter future depends not only on water-related matters, but also on sound 
institutional and market-related environment. Especially land tenure systems should 
be revised and secured for SIS farmers. 
 
South Africa’s new water policy faces a difficult transition period. It has to deal with 
the legacy of apartheid and the history of SIS. If well managed, the NWA may form a 
powerful tool to achieve equity, poverty alleviation and development in rural areas. 
Early experiences in South Africa and internationally show that sound, cautious and 
State-controlled implementation remains necessary. 
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Licence  A license is a legal entitlement to use water, g ranted for a period of 40 years maximum 
(users must be registered). Its terms and conditions may be reviewed and amended at a 
period listed in the license, which will not be more than 5 years. 
It does not guarantee water availability or quality to the licensed users. 
It may be surrendered, withdrawn, transferred totally or partially, temporarily or 
permanently. It may be inherited by a successor-in-title to a licensed water user. 
Transfer of licenses is possible (water rights’ market). 
A use is regulated by a license when there is a high risk of unacceptable impact if not 
controlled (overuse, degradation…). 
A reserve must be determined for a water resource before any license can be issued. 
DWAF may call for compulsory licensing of water use (i.e. decide on l icense allocation, 
terms and conditions for all prospective users) in stressed resources areas where there may 
be problems experienced from over-utilization, competing water users, or very inequitable 
allocation. Such calls for compulsory licensing will apply to all water users and rights, 
including general authorizations and existing lawful uses. An allocation schedule will be 
proposed in such instances. 
General 
Authorization 
A general authorization is an authorization to use water without a license, with certain 
limits and conditions, and it is valid for 3 to 5 years. It may be reviewed at intervals of not 
less than 2 years. 
It only applies to new water use that has taken place since October 1999, when the Act was 
fully promulgated. 
It applies to any water use anywhere in the country, unless areas are specifically excluded 
from it. It may also apply to a particular water resource. It is generally issued in an area 
with relatively sufficient water. 
It allows certain water use which has a small or insignificant impact on a water resource 
(i.e. limited abstraction and storage, irrigation with waste water, discharge of waste 
water…) 
General authorization users are usually not required to apply for licenses (except in water 
stressed situations), but they must be registered in most cases. 
Existing 
lawful use 
Existing lawful uses correspond to authorization that were granted from October 1996 to 
September 1998, just before the application of the National Water Act. 
Existing lawful users are usually not required to apply for licenses (except in water 
stressed situations), but they must be registered  
Schedule 1  Schedule 1 uses of water have minimal or insignificant impact on water resources. 
They include amongst other uses “reasonable” garden watering and rainwater storage. 
Schedule 1 users are not required to register, or to apply for licenses. 
Reserve  The Reserve is the only right to water in law. It is not a water use right per se. 
It consists of 2 parts, i.e. the ecological reserve and the basic human needs reserve, which   20 
includes water for drinking, food preparation and personal hygiene. 
It specifies the quantity and quality of water that must be present in a given water resource, 
according to its hydrological, ecological and demographic features. 
All other water use rights are subject to the requirements of the Reserve. 
 